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[The case] for flexible exchange rates [is] best if each nation (and currency) has
internal factor mobility but external factor immobility. [If ] factors are mobile across
national boundaries then a flexible exchange system becomes unnecessary.’
– Mundell, Robert A. 1961. A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas.
1 Introduction
Unemployment differentials are much larger between countries in the euro area than they
are between U.S. states. Figure 1 plots unemployment rates in 12 Western European euro
area economies and 48 U.S. states between 1995 and 2015, together with the euro area and
U.S. averages (the dark lines). Average unemployment in both the United States and Europe
declined prior to the Great Recession and then increased by roughly 5 percentage points
during the crisis. This similarity at the aggregate level, however, masks a tremendous amount
of variation across countries in the euro area that is not observed across U.S. states. The
cross-sectional standard deviation of unemployment, averaged over 1995-2015, is more than
three times greater in the euro area (3.8 percent) than the United States (1.2 percent).
Large and persistent unemployment differentials within the euro area pose a significant
risk to the currency union because a common monetary policy cannot be tailored to country-
specific economic conditions. Mundell (1961) famously argued that factor mobility was a
necessary pre-condition for an optimum currency area; in the face of a country-specific shock,
factor inputs must adjust if relative prices cannot. Despite concerns about the extent of
labor market integration in Europe, member states moved ahead with the adoption of the
euro. Today the question remains: are European labor markets flexible enough to adjust to
macroeconomic shocks in the absence of independent, national monetary policies? If they
are not sufficiently flexible, what is the cost of maintaining the currency union? Our main
empirical finding is that net migration responds more to unemployment differentials in the
United States compared to Europe. But, how important is this margin of adjustment for
explaining macroeconomic performance in the United States relative to Europe?
To answer these questions, we develop a multi-country DSGE model that incorporates
both a search and matching framework giving rise to unemployment, and a migration decision
that generates cross-border labor flows. We calibrate the model to the multi-country economy
of Europe. The model reflects country size, migration patterns, trade, unemployment and
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currency regimes. We estimate the structural parameters of the model to match the empirical
elasticity of net migration to unemployment in Europe.
The model allows us to evaluate Mundell’s conjecture that factor mobility serves as a
substitute for independent monetary policy in a realistic setting that reflects the actual eco-
nomic conditions in Europe. In the spirit of Mundell (1961), we examine the responses to
country-specific demand shocks that generate changes in the demand for labor. Our analysis
suggests that, if the euro area had the same degree of labor mobility as the United States, the
cross-sectional standard deviation in unemployment differentials across countries would fall
by a quarter and would be accompanied by substantial increases in migration. Conversely, if
the euro area had flexible exchange rates, there would also be a reduction in unemployment
differentials though this would entail large changes in inflation rates across countries that may
be difficult to tolerate in an integrated economy.
While the counterfactual unemployment rates are somewhat similar under high labor mo-
bility and under flexible exchange rates, the mechanisms that achieve these outcomes are very
different. In the first case – an environment with greater labor mobility – countries with high
unemployment would experience labor outflows, which reduce unemployment and also reduce
total production. In the GIIPS economies, the required outflow between 2008 and 2015 would
have been more than 5 percent of the population, instead of the 1 percent outflow observed
in the data. In the second case – flexible exchange rates – countries with high unemployment
would cut interest rates and devalue their currency to stimulate the economy. Again the
domestic unemployment rate would fall but this time would be accompanied by an increase
in total production. As Mundell suggested, labor mobility and flexible exchange rates are
substitutes along some dimensions – both reduce unemployment and wage differentials – but
they differ along other dimensions – notably output and inflation. Given the heterogeneity
across European economies, national policy makers are likely to have conflicting views about
the relative benefits of increased labor mobility and adherence to a common monetary policy.
2 Related Literature
Our research relates to the classic literature on ”optimal currency areas”, dating back to
Friedman’s Case for Flexible Exchange Rates (Friedman, 1953). The European debt crisis and
the divergence in economic outcomes across the euro area spurred a resurgence of research on
this topic. Among the papers most closely related to our work is Farhi and Werning (2014)
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who study labor migration in response to external demand shortfalls and the impact on the
economies that receive the labor inflow as well as on those economies experiencing the ouflow.
They find that labor outflows can benefit those who are staying, especially if economies are
tightly linked through trade. A similar effect occurs in our model – particularly when there
are strong labor market frictions and low trade elasticities. Complementary to our work is
Hauser and Seneca (2018) who show that a mobile labor force reduces the welfare costs of
joining a monetary union.
Our work also relates to studies investigating different mechanisms in which trade and
migration are interrelated (Davis and Weinstein, 2002; Burstein et al., 2017; Di Giovanni,
Levchenko and Ortega, 2015; Caliendo, Dvorkin and Parro, 2015). For example, building on
the quantitative trade literature for policy analysis, Caliendo et al. (2017) add migration to
an Eaton-Kortum framework to study the welfare effects of the EU enlargement in 2004 for
both low-skilled and high-skilled workers. They find large welfare gains for the new member
countries, while the welfare gains are small for the old member countries, and even negative
if the enlargement had not reduced trade barriers as well. While sharing some features with
their model, our approach differs in that we focus on the interplay of migration and unem-
ployment rates at business cycle frequency, as opposed to the effect of a permanent reduction
in migration costs. Consequently, our model includes nominal rigidities, search and matching
frictions in the labor market and international bond markets, which are all features that are
missing in Caliendo et al. (2017).
Our paper is not the first to empirically analyze the response of migration to labor market
conditions. Our results that the response of migration to cyclical fluctuations is substantially
stronger in the U.S. than in Europe and that recent years have seen a convergence with
migration rates falling in the U.S. while picking up in Europe, have been documented in the
literature. The seminal paper in this literature is Blanchard and Katz (1992) who estimate
the joint behavior of employment growth, the employment rate and the participation rate in
response to a positive region-specific labor demand shock in the U.S. Using a VAR approach
they find that a decrease in employment by 100 workers leads to an outmigration of 65 workers
in the first year, together with an increase in unemployment by 30 workers. Subsequent
studies have documented a slight decline of interstate mobility since the early 90s in response
to local labor demand shocks (Molloy, Smith and Wozniak, 2011; Dao, Furceri and Loungani,
2017; Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl, 2017; Yagan, 2014), similar to our results. Applying the
Blanchard and Katz (1992) method to European data, Beyer and Smets (2015) report that in
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response to labor market shocks, migration reacts less than half as much in Europe, although
the role of migration as an adjustment mechanism has become more important over time. The
low migration response in Europe has been confirmed by several studies (Decressin and Fatas,
1995; Huart and Tchakpalla, 2015) and is in line with our results.1 Our contribution to this
literature is two-fold: First, we substantially increase the sample size of European countries
and gather new data on observed migration flows (as opposed to migration flows deduced
from population movements). This data suggests that the difference between the U.S. and
Europe is even larger than estimated in Beyer and Smets (2015). Second, while the cited
literature is mostly empirical, we use the estimated cyclical relationship between migration
and unemployment as moments for the calibration of our DSGE model to quantify the effects
of migration on economic outcomes under fixed and flexible exchange rates.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Data
Geographical Coverage We analyze migration flows within three geographical areas: the
United States, Canada and Europe. The sample for the United States consists of 48 states
(excluding Alaska and Hawaii due to their geographical isolation). The Canadian sample
includes all ten provinces. We consider two samples of European countries. Our first sample
is a “narrow” set that includes only the twelve core euro area countries of Western Europe
(including Denmark whose currency is pegged to the euro during our sample period). These
countries are a fairly homogenous group in terms of economic development and moreover they
removed restrictions on labor mobility in the late 1980’s to early 1990’s.2 Our second sample is
a “wide” set which includes an additional 17 European countries. These additional countries
are either part of the European Union or part of the European Free Trade Association, and
liberalized cross-border labor flows somewhat later.3
1Both Beyer and Smets (2015) and Jauer et al. (2014) report that migration responses within European
countries in response to local demand shocks are comparable to those observed within the United States.
2The “narrow” sample includes Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Nether-
lands, Austria, Portugal, Finland. We exclude Luxembourg due to its tiny size, the paucity of migration data
and the high share of cross-border commuters in the total share of the workforce, which was above 40 percent
in 2010 according to Statistics Luxembourg.
3The “wide” sample includes all of the countries in the “narrow” sample plus Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovak Republic, Sweden,
United Kingdom, Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland.
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Sample Period For the United States and Canada, our sample period is 1977-2015. The
sample choice is governed by the lack of unemployment and migration data at the subnational
level prior to the mid 1970’s. For the European sample, we focus on 1995-2015. Before 1995,
migration data is available only for a handful of countries and restrictions on labor mobility
were still prevalent in a number of euro area countries.
Data Sources We collect data on population, unemployment rates and migration by state
and by country. We follow the United Nations in defining a migrant as any person moving
into or out of a country or state irrespective of their nationality or their country/state of
birth. Data on annual, bilateral migration flows at the U.S. state level are provided by the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and begin in 1975. Migration data are based on the the mailing
addresses of tax returns and encompass all U.S. tax filers. Migration rates between states are
measured as returns with changes of address from one state to another. We use the IRS data
- as opposed to alternative sources used in the literature, such as the American Community
Survey and the Current Population Survey - because the IRS data do not suffer from small
sample sizes that could be problematic for measuring migration flows of small states.4 Data on
state population and unemployment rates are provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis
and the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Data for Canadian provinces come from Statistics Canada. Migration data start in 1972
and unemployment data start in 1977.
Data on migration in Europe are provided by both Eurostat and national statistical agen-
cies. The underlying data sources vary across countries. Administrative data are used in
countries where registration is mandatory (e.g., all Scandinavian countries); otherwise, survey
data is used (e.g. in the UK). There are two complications associated with the European data.
First, there are discrepancies in the definition of what constitutes a migrant prior to 2008.
Second, for each country pair, we have two measures of in- and out-migration. We adjust the
data to account for both features. Details on these adjustments are in Appendix A. Again, a
migrant is defined by a change in residency. For instance, both a German and French citizen
moving from France to Germany are counted as emigrants from France and immigrants to
Germany. Our panel data for Europe are unbalanced, as displayed in Appendix Table A4.
4The IRS data are used by the U.S. Census to calculate state-level net migration rates since 1981. The
U.S. Census adjusts the raw IRS data to account for households that do not file taxes. As discussed in the
Appendix, these adjustments are rather small.
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We have complete data for twelve countries. For another nine countries, data begin in 1998.5
Data on unemployment rates are collected through national labor force surveys and reported
by Eurostat.6 The Appendix provides more details on data sources and the construction of
the migration database for Europe.
Migration We begin by examining migration patterns in North America and Europe. As we
will show, migration rates have been declining in the United States and have been gradually
increasing in Europe. Despite these trends, there remains substantially more migration in the
United States and Canada relative to Europe.
We define the gross migration rate as the average of inflows and outflows over one year
divided by the population at the beginning of the year.7 That is, the gross migration rate of
country or state i at time t is
Gross migrationi,t =
1
2
In-migrationi,t + Out-migrationi,t
Populationi,t
where Populationi,t is country or state i’s population at the beginning of year t.
Table 1 reports migration rates for the the United States, Canada and the two European
samples. In the table, migration rates are first averaged over time, and then averaged across
countries (or states), using simple averages. The table shows that migration rates are sub-
stantially higher in North America than in Europe. The U.S. gross migration rate is more
than 3 percent while it is less than 1 percent in both European samples. Canadian migration
is in between with a gross migration rate of 2 percent. These differences in migration rates
could be due to geographical differences between the three regions. One might think that
larger, more populous regions would have less cross-border migration than smaller regions.
Table 1 shows that U.S. states are, on average, smaller in terms of population than European
countries, which could explain the relatively low migration rates in Europe. Figure 2 shows
that while countries or states with greater populations do have less migration, the U.S. rate
remains substantially greater than the European rate even after controlling for population. In
addition to country size, there are many additional possible explanations for the difference in
5The first group consists of Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Slovenia,
Finland, Sweden, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland. The second group consists of Ireland, Greece, Spain, Cyprus,
Latvia, Lithuania, Austria, Portugal, United Kingdom
6Labor force surveys are harmonized across Europe and use the same definition of unemployment as in the
United States.
7For the United States, we divide the average number of migrating tax returns by the number of all tax
returns observed in t that originate from state i. This is also the approach used by the U.S. Census.
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migration rates between North America and Europe. Language, culture, institutional differ-
ences, and so forth, all present barriers to labor flows that could be greater in Europe relative
to the United States and Canada. For instance, Beine, Bricongne and Bourgeon (2013) show
that migration flows are by about 85 percent larger between countries that share the same
language. In our analysis in Section 4 we are agnostic about the specific frictions that impede
labor mobility. The purpose of the model is to capture the consequences of lower mobility in
Europe abstracting from the underlying cause.
Figure 3 displays average gross migration rates for the United States, Canada and the two
European samples plotted over time. Migration rates have been trending down in the United
States and Canada (see Molloy, Smith and Wozniak, 2011). Since the mid-70s migration rates
have fallen from 3.75 percent to 3 percent in the United States, and from 3.2 percent to 1.75
percent in Canada. In contrast, migration has gradually increased in Europe though the rate
is still well below the U.S. rate.
Not all migrants moving to a U.S. state come from another U.S. state. We define the
internal migration rate as the number of migrants from state i that come from or leave for
another U.S. state, as a share of state i’s total population. That is, internal migration for
U.S. states excludes migration flows from or to areas outside the United States. Similar
calculations are made for Canada and Europe.8 Table 1 shows that almost all of the migrants
in U.S. states come from other U.S. states; i.e., the difference between the gross migration rate
and the internal migration rate is relatively small. In Europe (and Canada), the difference is
larger reflecting the greater importance of external migration in those regions.
The last row in Table 1 reports the standard deviation of the net migration rate over time.
The net migration rate is the difference between a state’s total inflows and total outflows as
a share of its population
Net migrationi,t =
In-migrationi,t −Out-migrationi,t
Populationi,t
.
Net migration includes all migratory flows (both internal and external to the region). Because,
on average, overall net migration in the United States will be close to zero (each incoming
migrant is another state’s outgoing migrant), we report the standard deviation of net migration
over time. The bottom row of Table 1 reports the standard deviation of net migration for
8For calculating internal migration we include migration to and from Alaska, Hawaii and Washington D.C.
as internal to the United States. Similarly, we include all 29 European countries as internal migration in both
the ’Europe’ and ’Core euro area’ cases.
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the United States, Canada and Europe. Unlike the gross migration rates and the internal
migration rates, which were substantially different between the United States and Europe,
net migration rates are more comparable. The average across all states is 0.48 in North
America, and about 0.3 in Europe. Net flows in Europe are therefore more than half as large
as in North America, despite substantially lower gross flows. Countries in Europe therefore
tend to experience either inflows or outflows of migrants, while these flows tend to cancel out
in North America.
Unemployment Rates We now turn our attention to the difference in unemployment rates
in the United States, Canada and Europe. As described below, we first de-mean unemploy-
ment rates in both the cross-sectional and the time dimension. This removes long-run average
differences as well as common cyclical variations in unemployment rates.
Here we describe our treatment of the data for a country i in Europe. A similar construction
applies for a U.S. state or for a Canadian province. Let country i’s unemployment rate at time
t be uri,t and let the long-run average unemployment rate in country i be uri =
1
T
∑T
t=1 uri,t.
The aggregate unemployment rate for Europe at time t is the population-weighted sum of
countries’ unemployment rates, urt =
1
N
∑N
i=1
popi
pop
uri,t, where N is the number of countries
in the European sample, popi/pop is the share of country i’s population in Europe. The
average unemployment rate ur is simply the time series average ur = 1
T
∑T
t=1 urt. Then, the
double-demeaned unemployment rate for country i is
ûri,t = uri,t − uri − (urt − ur). (3.1)
Our empirical analysis centers on the properties of the unemployment rates ûri,t. The rate
ûri,t is an indication of whether country i’s unemployment is high relative to its own long-run
rate and relative to other countries’ rates at a given point in time. In effect this captures the
country-specific, cyclical component of a country’s unemployment rate.9
Figure 4 plots the standard deviations of the demeaned unemployment rates, together
with their average over time,
∑
t std (ûri,t). For the United States and Canada the standard
deviation of unemployment rates is about 1. For the two European samples, the standard
deviation is roughly 2.5. The earlier observation of greater unemployment rate dispersion
9The double-demeaning procedure is similar to applying country and time fixed effects. There are small
differences because our panel is not balanced and because we use a country-weighted average for the time fixed
effect. Repeating the analysis with fixed effects yields virtually the same results.
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in Europe relative to the United States (see Figure 1) is not driven by long-run differences
across countries (or states), but remains even after removing country averages and common
cyclical changes in unemployment. Unemployment rates were somewhat more dispersed in
the U.S. during the early 1980’s and in the Great Recession. Unemployment rates in Europe
diverge particularly during the debt crisis in 2011 - 2013, with a standard deviation of almost
5 percentage points in the core euro area.
We next examine the persistence of unemployment differentials. Following Jorda` (2005),
we estimate a local projection of unemployment rates on their own lags. For each horizon h
we estimate the following regression
ûri,t+h = β
h
0 ûri,t + β
h
1 ûri,t−1 + β
h
2 ûri,t−2 + 
h
i,t ∀h = 0, 1, .., H (3.2)
up to a nine year horizon H = 9. βˆh0 is an estimate of the impulse response of unemployment
rates to its own innovation at horizon h. The upper part of Figure 5 displays the estimated
coefficients βˆh for the United States (a), Canada (b), Europe (c) and the euro area (d). The
estimates show that unemployment rate differentials are persistent in all cases, but partic-
ularly so in Europe and the euro area. In response to an innovation of 1 percentage point,
unemployment differentials initially rise by 0.5 to 0.8 percentage points in Europe and stay
above 1 percent for 3 to 4 years.10
To summarize, this section has shown that (demeaned) unemployment rates are more dis-
persed across European countries than U.S. states and that this dispersion is quite persistent,
especially in the euro area.
3.2 Unemployment Rates and Net Migration
We are particularly interested in the relationship between net migration flows and unemploy-
ment differentials and how this relationship differs across regions. To study this relationship
we regress net migration on the unemployment rate as follows:
n̂mi,t = βûri,t + i,t, (3.3)
10In an earlier version of this paper, we estimated the AR(2) specification
uˆi,t = βi + β1uˆi,t−1 + β2uˆi,t−2 + 
u
i,t.
The comparison of the Jorda projections with the parametric AR(2) representation is very similar.
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where ûri,t is the double-demeaned unemployment rate as defined in (3.1) and n̂mi,t is the
double-demeaned net migration rate (calculated analogously). This specification, which fo-
cuses on demeaned variables, implicitly assumes that what matters for migration choices is a
region’s unemployment rate relative to the national unemployment rate at a particular point
in time.
Table 2 displays the results of this regression and Figure 6a shows the scatterplot of the
data. As before, the time period for the North American samples is 1977-2014, and 1995-
2015 for the European samples. The U.S. coefficient is −0.27 with a standard error of 0.03
(Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors are reported). Thus in years when a state has a 1
percentage point higher de-meaned unemployment rate, net migration falls by 0.27 percentage
points. In other words, an increase of 100 unemployed workers in a state coincides with out-
migration of 27 people from that state. These regressions are not meant to be interpreted
causally. Rather, we are simply documenting that periods with relatively high unemployment
are associated with periods of net outmigration.
Panel (a) of Figure 7 displays the estimated β coefficients for the United States when
we run regression (3.3) separately for all years in our sample. While there are year-to-year
differences in the estimated slope coefficient, the yearly estimates are close to the estimate
of −0.27 found for the full sample. Some papers have argued that migration played a minor
role during the Great Recession compared to other recessions.11 The estimated coefficients in
Figure 7 suggest otherwise. In 2010 the estimated coefficient is βˆ = −0.25 (0.05), close to the
coefficient estimated on the entire sample. One explanation for why we find an important role
for migration is that we control for long-run trends by demeaning the data. States in the Sun
Belt have seen substantial migration inflows over the last 40 years. But these states were also
the most negatively affected states during the Great Recession. Their rise in unemployment
coincided with reduced inflows of workers and therefore pushed their migration rates down
to those observed in other states, flattening out the relationship between unemployment and
net migration. Failure to control for long-run trends yields a coefficient of βˆ = −0.05 in
11For instance, using micro data from the American Community Survey (ACS) Yagan (2014) reports that
migration only played a minor insurance role during the Great Recession as compared to the 2001 recession.
Similarly, Beraja, Hurst and Ospina (2016) maintain a “no cross-state migration” assumption in their analysis
of regional business cycles based on a small correlation between interstate migration and employment growth
during the Great Recession.
11
2009-2010.12
The relationship between unemployment rates and net migration is much smaller in Eu-
rope. The estimated coefficient for the core euro area is almost identical to the one for Europe
as a whole (βˆ = −0.09 (0.01) vs. βˆ = −0.08 (0.01)). Canada’s coefficient (βˆ = −0.23 (0.02))
is closer to that of the United States.
So far, we have focused on the contemporaneous relationship between unemployment rates
and net migration at an annual frequency. As we described above, unemployment rate differ-
entials tend to persist over time. This is particularly true for Europe. One would therefore
expect migration flows to persist as well, potentially resulting in substantial changes in regional
populations. To quantify these population changes, we perform a local projection analysis by
estimating the horizon-specific regressions
n̂mi,t+h = β
h
0 ûri,t + β
h
1 ûri,t−1 + β
h
2 ûri,t−2 + 
h
i,t ∀h = 0, 1, .., H
with H = 9. The estimated coefficient βh0 provides us with an estimate of the response of net
migration to changes in unemployment rates at horizon h. Based on the estimated coefficients
βh0 , we can also calculate the implied cumulative population response at each horizon. The
cumulative response is the change in population associated with the estimated migration flows
(ignoring population changes due to birth and death).
The middle panels in Figure 5 show the estimated response of net migration over time to a
1 percentage point unemployment differential (i.e., the panels report the estimated coefficients
βˆh0 for each h). For the United States (column a), the net migration rate falls by a bit more than
0.25 percent. In the following year, net migration falls more, to roughly −0.3 percent. It takes
5 to 6 years to return to its mean, slightly before the unemployment rate differential dissipates.
The lower row of panels in Figure 5 show the cumulative change in population implied by the
net migration estimates. Following an increase in unemployment of 1 percentage point above
its mean, a state’s population falls by roughly 1.3 percent after five years, and remains below
average for several years afterwards. This reduction in population is substantial and even
exceeds the initial increase in the unemployment rate. It is conceivable that these migration
flows have significant feedback effects and alter the response of macroeconomic variables over
the business cycle.
12Beraja, Hurst and Ospina (2016) find a slope of 0 rather than −0.05. This difference can be attributed
to our use of IRS data instead of ACS data and that we focus on the unemployment rate instead of the
employment rate.
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Columns (c) and (d) of Figure 5 repeat the local projections for the European samples.
The overall dynamics of migration flows are similar, but are clearly smaller than the U.S.
reactions. The fall in population is only about one third of the response in the U.S. (−0.47 vs.
−0.3). While the population response is somewhat stronger for the euro core area (−0.95), it
is even more delayed (nine years) and its magnitude has to be interpreted against the backdrop
of more persistent (the upper panel) and larger unemployment rate differentials (see Figure
4).
To summarize, we find that (i) Labor is less mobile in Europe relative to the United States.
(ii) Unemployment differentials are larger and more persistent in Europe relative to the United
States. (iii) Net migration reacts to regional differences in unemployment rates in both the
United States and in Europe though the relationship is notably weaker in Europe. (iv) The
implied changes in population are economically significant in both regions.
4 A DSGE Model with Cross-Country Labor Mobility
In this section, we develop a multi-country model with cross-border migration to analyze the
tradeoff between labor mobility and exchange rate adjustment emphasized by Mundell. The
distinctive features of the model are labor mobility across countries, unemployment, and price
rigidity. The first two features allow us to directly compare the model to the empirical patterns
in Section 2. The third feature allows monetary policy to affect real economic activity. We
introduce labor mobility in a tractable way which exploits the “large” household assumption as
in Merz (1995). We introduce unemployment into our model through the standard Diamond-
Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP) search-and-matching framework (see Diamond, 1982; Mortensen,
1982; Pissarides, 1985).
4.1 Households
The world is populated by i = 1, ...,N countries. The number of households in country i is
fixed and given by Ni. Country i’s representative household consists of a unit mass of members
that live and work in any country j = 1, ...,N . We abstract from commuting and impose that
household members have to live in the same place that they work. The share of country i’s
household members that live in country j at time t is denoted by nij,t, with
∑
j n
i
j,t = 1. We
use superscripts to denote the country of origin and subscripts to denote the current living
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and working place of members of a household.
The model is written in per capita terms. To convert any quantity variable Xi,t to a
national total, we scale by the population of country i at time t. Due to migration, the
population of country i, denoted by Ni,t, might differ from the number of household members
who originate from country i, Ni, and can be calculated as
Ni,t =
∑
j
nji,tNj. (4.1)
Household members supply a fixed amount of labor li in the country of their current residence,
so that total labor supply in country i is simply equal to country i’s population times li.
Household members born in country i but who live in j consume country j’s final good
(their consumption is denoted cij,t). These country-specific final goods cannot be traded. As
described later, firms in every country produce the final good using combinations of trad-
able intermediate goods sourced from different countries. That is, production of the final
consumption good features home bias, so that the law of one price does not hold.
In addition to receiving utility from consumption, household members receive a time-
invariant utility gain or loss tied to their current residence, as is commonly assumed in the
literature in spatial economics (see e.g. Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl (2017), Sterk (2015)
and the literature review in Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2017)). We think of this utility
term as representing location-specific amenities, e.g. climate, scenery, other characacteristics
of physical geography, but also language and culture. Even though some countries might
be more attractive than others, we allow a country’s “appeal” to differ between households
from different countries. For instance, Denmark might be generally less attractive due to its
rainy climate, but small language and cultural differences might make it easier for a Swedish
household to move to Denmark than for a Spanish one. We denote the utility gain from
living in j for a household member from country i by Aij and assume that it is common to all
members within the same household. We normalize the “home” amenity parameter to Aii = 0
for all i.
Within each representative household, members differ in their taste for a specific location.
In equilibrium, only the most “cosmopolitan” members choose to live abroad, i.e. those
household members with the strongest taste for living abroad. As the share of “expats”
increases, less cosmopolitan household members move abroad decreasing the average utility
gain per migrant. We formalize this idea by assuming that the average utility gain from living
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abroad—beyond utility differences due to different consumption and labor supply levels—is
Aij−
ln(nij,t)
γ
, which is decreasing in nij,t for γ > 0.
13 The parameter 1
γ
governs the heterogeneity
across members’ tastes and, as we will see, will discipline how migration flows react to economic
conditions. We later estimate it to match our empirical results on the relationship between
migration flows and unemployment.
Taken together, the expected discounted sum of future household utility, as of date 0, is
given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{∑
j
nij,tU(c
i
j,t) +
∑
j 6=i
nij,t
(
Aij −
ln(nij,t)
γ
)}
.
Here E0 is the expectation operator at time 0 and β is the discount factor. The utility function
over consumption is described by
U(cij,t) =
(
cij,t
)1− 1
σ
1− 1
σ
,
where σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
Households receive income from various sources: labor income, capital income, profits of
various types of firms, bond payments, and lump-sum transfers / taxes. Since household
members might live in different countries, we have to specify where these incomes are earned.
We assume that labor income is earned in the country of residence. In contrast, we assume
that both the capital stock and the firms of country i are owned by the household members
originating from country i. A household member from country i that has moved to country
j therefore still receives capital income and profits from its country of origin i. Our model
features both (constant) lump-sum transfers and (time-varying) lump-sum taxes. Lump-
sum transfers are paid by governments to all residents of their country, independent of their
13This term enters the utility function as nij,t ln
(
nij,t
)
which is similar to the Kullback–Leibler divergence
measure of entropy relative to a uniform distribution. We can “microfound” this setup as follows: Assume
that each household can be partitioned into N − 1 subunits, each consisting of a continuum of household
members indexed by ιij ∈ (0, 1]. Each subunit is assigned a specific foreign country. Members of subunit j 6= i
have to choose whether to either live at home (i.e. in i) or abroad (i.e. in j). For a member with ιij , the utility
gain from living in country j is described by Aij − 1γ
(
ln(ιij) + 1
)
, with γ > 0. That is, members with a larger
ιij incur a larger loss from living in j. The sum of country i’s household members’ utility gain from living in
country j is then∫ nij,t
ε
(
Aij −
1
γ
(
ln(ιij) + 1
))
dιij = n
i
j,t
(
Aij −
1
γ
ln(nij,t)
)
− ε
(
Aij −
1
γ
ln(ε)
)
,
where  is a small positive number that ensures that the integral is finite.
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country of origin, whereas lump-sum taxes are levied on a country’s household, independent
of its members’ current residence.14
Because wages and the returns to capital may be earned in different locations, the ex-
change rate will affect the real value of income and the cost of consumption. Let Si,t be the
nominal exchange rate that converts country i’s currency into a reserve currency, and define
Sji,t =
Sj,t
Si,t
as the exchange rate to convert country j’s currency into country i’s currency. If
countries i and j are part of the same currency union, Si,t = Sj,t for all t. Household i’s labor
income, converted into country i’s currency, equals
∑
j S
j
i,tW
h
j,tn
i
j,tlj. Here, n
i
j,tlj describes the
household’s labor supplied in country j at time t. Labor is supplied inelastically by each
household member. We allow for country-specific variation in labor force participation rates
so the per capita labor supply li differs for each country. We calibrate these differences to
match observed labor force participation rates.15 Since labor is assumed to be uniform across
countries, each worker is paid the same nominal wage W hj,t irrespective of their country of
origin.
In addition to labor income, households receive income from renting capital to firms.
Let Ki,t−1 denote the capital in country i at the beginning of period t, divided by country
i’s population in period t − 1. Households can adjust the rate at which this capital stock is
utilized, ui,t, depending on the date-t realization of the state. Varying the utilization of capital
requires Ni,t−1Ki,t−1a (ui,t) units of the final good. Households then rent ui,tKi,t effective units
of capital to intermediate-good-producing firms and earn a rental price of Rki,t per effective
unit of capital.
Households receive nominal profits Ni,tΠi,t from firms as well as lump-sum nominal taxes
or transfers Ti,t. In addition to Ti,t we also include a set of constant location specific lump-sum
transfers τ ji = c
j
i − whi lji to residents living abroad. These additional transfers are included
to eliminate steady state income flows across countries in the steady state. We discuss this
technical adjustment in greater detail in the Appendix. Households receive income from
nominal bonds purchased in the previous period Bit−1. These bonds are denominated in the
reserve currency; thus the income from bond holdings is
Bit−1
Si,t
.
Households use the receipts to pay for consumption,
∑
j S
j
i,tPj,tn
i
j,tc
i
j,t, invest in the capital
stock of their country of origin, Ni,tPi,tXi,t, purchase state-noncontingent bonds, B
i
t
(1+it)Si,t
, pay
14We discuss how these transfers and taxes are set in Section 4.3.
15Notice that we assume that when a worker moves, he or she adopts the labor force participation rate in
the destination country.
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for utilization costs, Ni,t−1Ki,t−1Pi,ta(ui,t), and pay for any moving cost for members that
migrate. Total moving costs for household i are
∑
j 6=i S
j
i,tPj,tn
i
j,t
1
1−βΦ
(
nij,t
nij,t−1
)
. (Moving costs
are in units of the final good of a migrant’s destination country.) Similar to the restrictions on
the investment adjustment cost function, Φ is convex with Φ(1) = Φ′(1) = 0, and Φ′′(1) > 0.
Moving occurs within the period, so that migrants are immediately available for work in their
new country of residence.
Households choose their members’ locations nij,t, consumption in each location c
i
j,t, in-
vestment Xi,t, the rate of capital utilization ui,t, next period’s capital stock, Ki,t, and bond
holdings Bit for all t ≥ 0 to maximize the expected discounted sum of future period utilities
subject to the budget constraints
Ni
[(∑
j
Sji,tPj,tn
i
j,tc
i
j,t
)
+
(∑
j 6=i
Sji,tPj,tn
i
j,t
1
1− βΦ
(
nij,t
nij,t−1
))]
+ Ni,tPi,tXi,t + Ni
Bit
(1 + it)Si,t
= Ni
(∑
j
Sji,tn
i
j,t
(
W hj,tlj + Pj,tτ
i
j
))
+ Ni,t−1Ki,t−1
(
Rki,tui,t − Pi,ta(ui,t)
)
+ Ni,t (Πi,t − Ti,t) + NiB
i
t−1
Si,t
,
the capital accumulation constraint16
Ni,tKi,t = Ni,t−1Ki,t−1 (1− δ) +
[
1− Λ
(
Ni,tXi,t
Ni,t−1Xi,t−1
)]
Ni,tXi,t,
and the constraint on total labor supply from country i
∑
j
nij,t = 1.
The first-order condition for consumption is
U i1,i,ts
j
i,t = U
i
1,j,t,
where U i1,j,t denotes the marginal utility of consumption, c
i
j,t, and s
j
i =
Sji Pj
Pi
is the real exchange
rate between country i and j. According to this Backus-Smith risk-sharing condition, the
household shifts consumption towards members that live in countries with low real exchange
16We assume adjustment costs in investment as in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), with Λ(1) =
Λ′(1) = 0 and Λ′′(1) > 0.
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rates (Backus and Smith, 1993). The first-order condition for the location choice nij,t is
17
U(cij,t)− U(cii,t) + Aij −
1
γ
(
ln(nij,t) + 1
)
=
(
cij,t − whj,tlj − τ ij
)
U i1,j,t −
(
cii,t − whi,tli − τ ii
)
U i1,i,t
+
1
1− β
(
nij,t
nij,t−1
(
Φij,t
)′
+ Φij,t
)
U i1,j,t −
β
1− βEt

(
nji,t+1
nji,t
)2 (
Φij,t+1
)′
U i1,j,t+1
 ,
(4.2)
where we have written Φij,t for Φ
(
nij,t
nij,t−1
)
and where whj,t =
Whj,t
Pj,t
is the real wage received by
household members living in country j. The left hand side describes the gain in utility terms
of moving an additional household member from i to j. This gain consists of (i) the difference
in consumption- and labor-related utility and (ii) the utility gain from the amenities provided
in j. The right hand side describes the marginal cost, in utility terms: Moving a household
member from i to j affects the household’s budget constraint by shifting consumption spending
and labor income. In addition, the move generates moving costs, captured by the Φij terms in
period t and t+ 1.
The remaining first-order conditions are standard. The Euler equations associated with
the non-contingent bonds, Bit, require
U i1,i,t
si,t
= β(1 + it)Et
{
U i1,i,t+1
si,t+1
}
.
The utilization choice requires the first order condition
rki,t = a
′(ui,t),
where rki,t =
Rki,t
Pi,t
is the real rental price of capital. We assume that a(1) = 0 and a′(1) = rki , so
that u = 1 in steady state. The curvature parameter a′′(1) > 0 governs the cost of changing
utilization. The optimal choice for investment requires
1 = µi,t
(
1− Λi,t − Ni,tXi,tNi,t−1Xi,t−1Λ
′
i,t
)
+ βEt
{
µi,t+1
U i1,i,t+1
U i1,i,t
(
Ni,t+1Xi,t+1
Ni,tXi,t
)2
Λ′i,t+1
}
,
where µi,t denotes the shadow value of capital and where we have written Λi,t for Λ
(
Ni,tXi,t
Ni,t−1Xi,t−1
)
.
17A household’s location choice will affect a country’s population and therefore the per-capita value of the
capital stock. We assume that each country is populated by a continuum of households, so that each household
takes the evolution of a country’s population as given when taking its decisions. Similarly, the household also
takes lump-sum transfers, τ ij , as given.
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Finally, the first order condition for Ki,t implies that the shadow values µi,t satisfy
µi,t = βEt
{
U i1,i,t+1
U i1,i,t
[
ui,t+1r
k
i,t+1 + µi,t+1 (1− δ)− a (ui,t+1)
]}
.
4.2 Firms
There are two groups of firms in the model. First, there are firms that produce a non-tradable
“final good” used for consumption, investment and government purchases. The final good
producers take intermediate goods sourced from different countries as inputs. Second, there
are intermediate goods firms that produce the inputs for the final good. These intermediate
goods are produced in a two-stage process: Variety producers use capital and labor as inputs
and then supply their goods to intermediate goods firms. We assume that the prices of the
sub-intermediate variety goods are adjusted only infrequently according to the standard Calvo
mechanism.
4.2.1 Tradable Intermediate Goods
Each country produces a single (country-specific) type of tradable intermediate good. We
employ a two-stage production process to allow us to use a Calvo price setting mechanism.
In the first stage, monopolistically competitive domestic firms produce differentiated “sub-
intermediate” goods which are used as inputs into the assembly of the tradable intermediate
good for country i. In the second stage, competitive intermediate goods firms produce the
tradable intermediate good from a CES combination of the sub-intermediates. These firms
then sell the intermediate good on international markets at the nominal price pi,t. We describe
the production of the intermediate goods in reverse, starting with the second stage.
Second-Stage Producers The second stage producers assemble in a competitive way the
tradable intermediate good from the sub-intermediate varieties using a CES production func-
tion with an elasticity of substitution equal to ψq. Denoting the price of a sub-intermediate
good ξ by pi,t(ξ), it is straightforward to show that the demand for each sub-intermediate
good has an iso-elastic form
qi,t (ξ) = Qi,t
(
pi,t(ξ)
pi,t
)−ψq
, (4.3)
where Qi,t is the real quantity of country i’s tradable intermediate good produced at time t,
and pi,t is its price. This price is a combination of the prices of the sub-intermediates. In
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particular,
pi,t =
[∫ 1
0
(pi,t(ξ))
1−ψq dξ
] 1
1−ψq
. (4.4)
First-Stage Producers The sub-intermediate goods qi,t(ξ) which are used to assemble the
tradable intermediate good Qi,t are produced in the first stage. The first-stage producers hire
workers, Li,t(ξ), through human resource agencies at the nominal wage W
f
i,t and rent capital,
Ki,t(ξ), at the nominal rental price Ri,t. Unlike the firms in the second stage, the first-
stage, sub-intermediate goods firms are monopolistically competitive. They minimize costs
taking the demand curve for their product (4.3) as given. These firms have a Cobb-Douglas
production function
qi,t(ξ) = Zi,t (Ki,t(ξ))
α (Li,t(ξ))
1−α .
First-stage producers charge a markup for their products. The desired price naturally depends
on the demand curve (4.3). Each type of sub-intermediate good producer ξ freely chooses cap-
ital and labor each period but there is a chance that their nominal price pi,t (ξ) is fixed to some
exogenous level. In this case, the first-stage producers choose an input mix to minimize costs
taking the date-t price pi,t (ξ) as given. Cost minimization implies that all sub-intermediate
firms choose the same capital-to-labor ratio,
Ki,t (ξ)
Li,t (ξ)
=
α
1− α
W fi,t
Ri,t
=
Ni,t−1ui,tKi,t−1
Ni,tLi,t
,
whcih equals the ratio of the total amount of capital services, Ni,t−1ui,tKi,t−1 to the total
number of employed workers, Ni,tLi,t in country i at time t. It follows that the nominal
marginal cost of production is common across all the sub-intermediate goods firms
MCi,t =
(
W fi,t
)1−α
Rαi,t
Zi,t
(
1
1− α
)1−α(
1
α
)α
.
Pricing The nominal prices of the sub-intermediate goods are adjusted only infrequently
according to the standard Calvo mechanism. In particular, for any firm, there is a probability
θp that the firm cannot change its price that period. When a firm can reset its price it chooses
an optimal reset price to maximize the discounted value of profits per household. Firms in
country i act in the interest of the representative household born in i, so they apply the
household’s stochastic discount factor to all future income streams. It is well known that the
20
solution to this optimization problem requires
p∗i,t =
ψq
ψq − 1
∑∞
j=0 (θ
pβ)j
∑
st+j pi(s
t+j|st)U i1,i,t+j
Pi,t+j
(pi,t+j)
ψq MCi,t+jNi,t+jQi,t+j∑∞
j=0 (θ
pβ)j
∑
st+j pi(s
t+j|st)U i1,t+j,i
Pi,t+j
(pi,t+j)
ψq Ni,t+jQi,t+j
.
Because the sub-intermediate goods firms adjust their prices infrequently, the nominal price
of the tradable intermediate goods is sticky. In particular, using (4.4), the nominal price of
the tradable intermediate good evolves according to
pi,t =
[
θpp
1−ψq
i,t−1 + (1− θp)
(
p∗i,t
)1−ψq] 11−ψq . (4.5)
4.2.2 Nontradable Final Goods
The final goods are assembled from a (country-specific) CES combination of tradable interme-
diates produced by the various countries in the model. The final goods firms are competitive
in both the global input markets and the final goods market. The final goods producers solve
max
yji,t
{
Pi,tYi,t −
N∑
j=1
Sji,tpj,ty
j
i,t
}
subject to the CES production function
Yi,t =
( N∑
j=1
(
ωji,t
) 1
ψy
(
yji,t
)ψy−1
ψy
) ψy
ψy−1
(4.6)
Here, yji,t is the amount of country-j intermediate good used in production by country i at
time t and ψy is the trade elasticity. The weights ω
j
i,t for each country pair fluctuate around a
long-run average ω¯ji . We require
∑
j ω¯
j
i =
∑
j ω
j
i,t = 1. We calibrate the average values ω¯
j
i to
match average bilateral trade shares (see below). Demand for country-specific intermediate
goods is given by
yji,t = Yi,tω
j
i,t
(
Sji,t
pj,t
Pi,t
)−ψy
As we explain later, fluctuations in ωji,t serve as the main forcing variables in our model.
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4.3 Monetary Policy and Taxes
The model includes both fiscal and monetary policy variables. On the fiscal side, a govern-
ment’s expenditure consists of government purchases, unemployment benefits and lump-sum
taxes and transfers. The lump-sum taxes and transfers ensure that the government budget
constraint is balanced every period.
Monetary policy is conducted through a Taylor Rule of the form
ii,t = ı¯i + φiii,t−1 + (1− φi)
(
φQQi,t + φpipii,t
)
, (4.7)
where we assume the same reaction parameters φi, φQ and φpi across all countries. In our setup,
Qi,t corresponds to real GDP per capita and pii,t is the CPI-based inflation rate. Countries
in the euro area have a fixed nominal exchange rate for every country in the union and a
common nominal interest rate. Monetary policy for these countries is set by the ECB, which
follows the same Taylor rule as in (4.7), with the exception that it reacts to GDP-weighted
averages of innovations in GDP and inflation for the countries in the union.
4.4 Labor Market
The labor market is governed by a search-and-matching mechanism. For a worker to be
employed by a sub-intermediate good firm they first have to be hired by an employment
agency. The employment agency hires unemployed workers at the real household wage whi,t.
The agency then uses the workers to search for vacancies. Vacancies are posted by human
resource (HR) firms that pay a match wage wi,t for successful matches. The HR firms then
supply matched labor services to the sub-intermediate good firms that pay the firm wage wfi,t.
Below, we describe the labor market in greater detail, starting with the worker / employment
agency side.
4.4.1 Value Functions
Workers: Workers can only find jobs through an employment agency. Employment agencies
hire workers and try to match them with firms. At the beginning of every period t, the
agencies pay workers the real wage whi,t regardless of whether they can match them or not. If
the employment agency cannot immediately match the worker, the agency pays whi,t, but it
retains the unemployment benefit bi ≥ 0. If the employment agency matches the worker, the
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agency collects the real match wage wi,t paid by the HR firm. This match wage varies over
time and is paid as long as the match survives. This setup guarantees that all workers receive
the same wage, whi,t, and therefore operates as an insurance mechanism against unemployment.
Note that all wages respond to aggregate conditions and can change from period to period.
We denote the match probability for a job hunter hired by an employment agency in
country i at time t by fi,t. This probability is endogenous and discussed later. With that
probability, the employment agency receives the value from the match, denoted by Ei,t, which
is the wage received from the producing firm, wi,t, less the wage paid to the worker, w
h
i,t, for
the duration of the match. We assume a share d ∈ (0, 1) of workers loose their job every
period. The value of having an employed worker is therefore
Ei,t = wi,t − whi,t + (1− d)βEt {Ψi,t+1Ei,t+1} , (4.8)
where Ψi,t+1 =
ui1,i,t+1
ui1,i,t
is household i’s stochastic discount factor. With probability 1 − fi,t,
the employment agency cannot match the job hunter. In that case, the employment agency
receives only the unemployment benefit, bi, net of the wage paid to the worker, w
h
i,t. The
profit from hiring a job hunter is:
Hi,t = fi,tEi,t + (1− fi,t)(bi − whi,t).
We assume free entry in the market of employment agencies, so the profit from hiring a job
hunter, Hi,t, must be zero in equilibrium. This implies
Ei,t = −1− fi,t
fi,t
(bi − whi,t).
Firms: At the beginning of every period, HR firms post vacancies Vi,t to hire workers. There
is no initial setup cost of posting a new vacancy, but every vacancy, no matter whether it is
new or old, requires the firm to pay a per-period cost ς > 0 in terms of the final good.
We denote the probability that a vacancy gets filled by gi,t. If a vacancy gets filled, the HR
firm immediately receives the value of a filled vacancy, denoted by Ji,t. If not, the vacancy
stays posted the next period. The value of a posted vacancy to a firm is then given by the
following value function:
Vi,t = −ς + gi,tJi,t + (1− gi,t) βEt {Ψi,t+1Vi,t+1} .
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The value to an HR firm of having a filled job is the difference between the wage received from
the producing firm, wfi,t, and the wage paid to the employment agency, wi,t. With probability
d, the job gets destroyed and the HR firm has to post a new vacancy. The value of having a
filled vacancy is therefore
Ji,t = wfi,t − wi,t + (1− d) βJi,t+1 + dβEt {Ψi,t+1Vi,t+1}
We assume that HR firms have to incur a quadratic cost to adjust the number of posted
vacancies, expressed in proportion to the per-period posting cost. HR firms choose the number
of posted vacancies to maximize the discounted stream of expected net profits
max
Vt
Et
∞∑
s=0
βt+s
{
Ψi,t+sVt+s
(
Vi,t+s − ςΥ
(
Vi,t+s
Vi,t+s−1
))}
,
with Υ(1) = Υ′(1) = 0 and Υ′′(1) ≥ 0. Taking the first-order condition with respect to Vt
gives
Vi,t
ς
= Υi,t +
Vi,t
Vi,t−1
Υ′t − βEt
{
Ψi,t+1
(
Vi,t+1
Vi,t
)2
Υ′t+1
}
, (4.9)
where Υi,t = Υ
(
Vi,t
Vi,t−1
)
.
4.4.2 Labor Flows and Matching
Every period, job hunters, Hi,t, are matched with vacancies, Vi,t. The number of unemployed
at the end of the period is the labor force less the number of people employed. Recall that all
variables in the model are in per capita terms so the number of job hunters in country i at time
t is Ni,tHi,t and the number of people unemployed is Ni,t [li − Li,t]. The total number of job
hunters consists of three groups: (i) everyone who was unemployed at the end of the previous
period, Ni,t−1 [li − Li,t−1], (ii) all the workers who were employed last period but got laid off
over night, dNi,t−1Li,t−1 and (iii) new entrants into the labor force pool, li [Ni,t − Ni,t−1]. thus,
Ni,tHi,t = Ni,t−1 [li − Li,t−1] + dNi,t−1Li,t−1 + li [Ni,t − Ni,t−1] .
Note that a reduction in the labor force caused by out-migration, i.e. li [Ni,t − Ni,t−1] < 0,
directly reduces the number of job hunters in country i. These workers enter their destination
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country as unemployed job hunters. That is, we assume that matched workers never directly
exit the labor force.
Job hunters Hi,t and vacancies Vi,t are matched according to a standard matching function.
The number of matches per period is
Mi,t = m¯H
ζ
i,tV
1−ζ
i,t
where m¯ > 0 is a match efficiency parameter. The job finding rate, fi,t, is defined as matches
per job hunter
fi,t ≡ Mi,t
Hi,t
= m¯
(
Vi,t
Hi,t
)1−ζ
= m¯λ1−ζi,t ,
where λ = V
H
is the standard measure of labor market tightness. Similarly, the job filling rate
is
gi,t ≡ Mi,t
Vi,t
= m¯λ−ζi,t .
Firms produce output using labor from both the already employed and the newly matched
job hunters. The law of motion for employment is therefore
Ni,tLi,t = (1− d)Ni,t−1Li,t−1 + Ni,tMi,t.
Since the number of people unemployed at the end of the period is Ni,t [li − Li,t] and the total
labor force is Ni,t, the unemployment rate is simply
uri,t = li − Li,t. (4.10)
4.4.3 Wage Rigidity
Following Shimer (2010), we introduce wage rigidity through backward-looking wage setting
into the match wage wi,t. Specifically, wi,t, is a weighted average of the past match wage,
wi,t−1 and the current target match wage, denoted w∗i,t:
18
wi,t = θ
wwi,t−1 + (1− θw)w∗i,t. (4.11)
18See also Christoffel and Linzert (2005) for the same approach.
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The target wage, w∗i,t, is determined through Nash bargaining. Given a match (indexed by ξ),
the HR firm and the employment agency bargain over the target wage, say w∗i,t(ξ), taking the
other variables in the economy as given. The target wage solves the Nash bargaining problem
w∗i,t(ξ) = arg max
w(ξ)
{(Ei,t (w(ξ))− (bi − whi,t))% Ji,t (w(ξ))1−%}
where we write Ei,t (w(ξ)) and Ji,t (w(ξ)) to indicate that the value of this match (to both
the HR firm and the employment agency) depends on the bargained wage. In what follows,
we suppress the index ξ because in equilibrium, all matches result in the same wage. The
worker’s bargaining power is % ∈ (0, 1). Differentiating the bargaining objective with respect
to w∗i,t gives
%J (w∗i,t) = (1− %)
(E(w∗i,t)− (bi − whi,t)) .
Note that the value to the employment agency of having an employed worker that receives
a wage w∗i,t this period can be rewritten as E(w∗i,t) = w∗i,t − wi,t + E(wi,t), where E(wi,t) is
the value of having an employed worker that receives the equilibrium wage wi,t, as defined in
(4.8). Similarly, J (w∗i,t) = −w∗i,t + wi,t + J (wi,t). Thus, the target wage satisfies
w∗i,t = wi,t + %Ji,t − (1− %)
(Ei,t − (bi − whi,t))
where we are writing E(wi,t) = Ei,t and J (wi,t) = Ji,t. Combining this expression with 4.11
gives
wi,t = wi,t−1 +
1− θw
θw
[
%Ji,t − (1− %)
(Ei,t − (bi − whi,t))] .
4.5 Forcing Variables
To generate migration and unemployment as seen in the data, the model requires shocks
that imply relative differences in cross-country labor demand. Purely aggregate shocks to the
region as a whole will not have differential effects on wages and employment opportunities
across countries. The forcing variables we consider are shocks to the preferences weights (ωji,t)
in equation (4.6).19 Specifically, we assume that, for each country-pair, ωji,t is given by
ωji,t =
ω¯ji exp
(
εjt
)∑
k ω
k
i,t
.
19See Itskhoki and Mukhin (2017) for a recent paper that uses similar shocks.
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The variables, εjt , cause fluctuations in demand for country j’s tradable intermediate good.
These fluctuations can be interpreted either as changes in production technology or changes in
consumer preference. This formulation ensures that even though preference weights fluctuate,
they always sum to 1 for every final good producer, i.e.
∑
j ω
j
i,t = 1 for all t. The shock ε
j
t is
common to all countries that use goods from country j, including the country j itself.
These fluctuations formalize the idea of “terms-of-trade” shocks that Mundell (1961),
McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969) considered in their early discussions of optimal currency
areas.20 The shocks follow an AR(1) process with persistence ρ,
εjt = ρε
j
t−1 + 
j
t ∀j = 1, ..., N − 1.
4.6 Aggregation and Market Clearing
For each country i, aggregate production of the tradable intermediate goods is given by
Ni,tQi,t = Zi,t (Ni,t−1ui,tKi,t−1)α (Ni,tLi,t)1−α .
This is also equal to real aggregate GDP.21 The market clearing condition for the tradable
intermediate goods is
Ni,tQi,t =
N∑
j=1
Nj,tyij,t.
Final goods production is given by (4.6). The market clearing condition for the final good is
Ni,tYi,t = Ni,tCi,t + Ni,tXi,t + Ni,tGi,t + a(ui,t)Ni,t−1Ki,t−1 + ςNi,tVi,t,
where
Ni,tCi,t =
N∑
j=1
nji,tc
j
i,tNj
20Both Mundell (1961) and Kenen (1969) consider what they call a “productivity” shock. Their narra-
tive emphasizes that this shock generates excess demand for the foreign product and excess supply of the
domestically produced good and unemployment at home. Whether these follow from a productivity shock is
debatable, but they are captured by a negative “terms-of-trade” shock in our model.
21This expression for aggregate production is accurate only to a first-order approximation. For additional
discussion of this approximation see Gal´ı (2008) and Woodford (2003).
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is aggregate consumption in country i. The labor market clearing condition is given by (4.10).
Finally, the bond market clearing condition requires
N∑
i=1
NiBit = 0.
4.7 Steady State
We solve the model by log-linearizing the equilibrium conditions around a non-stochastic
steady state with zero inflation.22 We first solve for real rental price of capital, rki and the real
price of the intermediate good, pi
Pi
. We adjust the technology levels Zi so that the real price of
the intermediate good, and hence real exchange rates, are unity in all countries. We then solve
for the share of net exports in GDP, which depends on the trade preference weights, ω¯ji , and
country size as measured by their domestic absorption, NiYi. Given the shares of net exports
and government purchases in GDP, we can derive the shares of investment and consumption
in GDP.
We next solve for the steady-state values related to migration. We recover the amenity
values Aij by inverting the structural relationship describing the location choice, (4.2), which,
in steady state, is given by
u(cij)− u(cii) + Aij =
1
γ
(
ln(nij) + 1
)
.
Since steady-state values for cij and l
i
j are independent of A
i
j, there is a direct one-to-one
mapping of Aij to the migration shares n
i
j. We directly calibrate n
i
j to the data and adjust
Aij accordingly. Given n
i
j and data on population, Ni, we solve for the size of households, Nj,
from (4.1).
The real wage paid by firms, wfi , is proportional to GDP per employed worker.
wfi = (1− α)
ψq − 1
ψq
Qi
Li
,
where we directly back out employment, Li, from data on labor force participation, li, and the
unemployment rate, uri. From the optimality conditions of the labor market, we then derive
the real wage received by the household, whi . Finally, we solve for the consumption values of
migrants, cji , by exploiting the risk-sharing condition, c
j
i = c
j
j, and solving the linear equation
22See the Technical Appendix for details on the calculation of the steady state.
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system
CiNi =
∑
j
njic
j
iNj =
∑
j
njic
j
jNj.
4.8 Calibration and Estimation
The model is expressed at a quarterly frequency and calibrated to a European sample of 29
countries as well as a rest-of-the-world aggregate for the period 1995 - 2015. Appendix A
contains all information on the exact data series used for the calibration.
We partition the models’ parameters into two groups: for the first group of parameters,
we choose values commonly adopted in the literature or we directly calibrate them to ratios
observed in the data. Given these parameter values, we then estimate the remaining six
parameters that are either new to our model or where we have little guidance from previous
studies. Table 5 lists the parameter values used for our baseline calibration. We discuss the
calibrated parameters below.
4.8.1 Calibrated Parameters
Preferences We assume a discount factor of β = 0.99, which implies a real annual interest
rate of about 4 percent. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution is set to σ = 0.5.
Technology and Nominal Price Rigidity The elasticity of substitution between varieties
is ψq = 10, implying a markup of roughly 11 percent, in line with studies by Basu and
Fernald (1995) and Basu and Kimball (1997) among others. We calibrate the curvature
of the production function, α, to match the average labor income share, defined as w
fL
Q
=
(1 − α)ψq−1
ψq
.23 Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013) report a labor income share for Germany
of about 0.63 between 1975 and 2010. This corresponds to α = 0.30. We set the depreciation
rate to 0.021 for both samples, which implies an annual depreciation rate of 8 percent. For
the utilization cost function we follow Del Negro et al. (2013) by setting a′′ = 0.286. This
implies that a one percent increase in the real rental price causes an increase in the capital
utilization rate of 3.5 percent.
We calibrate the Calvo parameter to roughly match observed frequencies of price adjust-
ment in the micro data. Evidence on price adjustment in Europe suggests an average duration
of prices of 13 months, which corresponds to θp = 0.77 (Alvarez et al., 2006).
23Our model features several distinct wages. For the purposes of our calibration, we count any income
generated by HR firms and employment agencies as labor income, so the relevant labor income is wfL.
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Trade and Country Size The trade elasticity ψy is set to 0.5. This is comparable to pa-
rameter values used in international business cycle models with trade. Using aggregate data
Heathcote and Perri (2002) estimate an elasticity of ψy = 0.90 at quarterly frequency, whereas
Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1994) calibrate an elasticity of 1.5.24 Firm-level estimates of
short-run elasticities range from almost 0 in Boehm, Flaaen and Pandalai-Nayar (Forthcom-
ing) to values closer to 1.5 in Cravino (2014) and Proebsting (2015). We consider a higher
trade elasticity in the sensitivity analysis below.
In steady state, our trade preference weights, ωji , are equal to the share of imports in
domestic absorption:
ωji =
yji∑
j y
j
i
.
To calibrate ωji , we therefore rely on bilateral trade data. In particular, we use data from the
OECD on trade in value added (TiVA). The data has information on the value added content
of final demand by source country for all country pairs in our European data sample, which
allows us to calculate both ωji and NiYi. We adjust the weights to ensure that net exports
are zero in steady state. The steady-state calibration is based on an average over the years
2000-2005. For the average European country in our sample, the import share is about 40
percent,
Migration We back out the amenity values, Aij, from observed migration shares. To approx-
imate the share of migrants in steady state, we use data from the U.N. database on migrant
stocks (United Nations, 2017). The U.N. reports data on total migrant stocks by country of
current residence and by country of origin at five-year intervals covering 1995 - 2015. From
this data, we derive the share of people born in country i living in country j, nij, for all Eu-
ropean countries in our sample plus a rest-of-the-world aggregate. We then take an average
across all reported time periods. The average share of people living abroad is 8 percent in our
sample, substantially lower than the import share of goods and services (see Table 4). Given
values for nij and data on population, Ni, we solve for the number of households originating
in country j, Nj, using (4.1).
Labor Market As discussed in the empirical section, data on unemployment rates in Europe
are provided by Eurostat. Country-specific steady-state unemployment rates are measured
24Their model is calibrated to the U.S. They cite several studies that find lower elasticities for Europe.
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as the sample averages, uri. The steady state unemployment rate is 8.5 percent for Europe.
Similarly, we use sample averages to calibrate the labor supply li to observed ratios of labor
force to population using data from Eurostat. The OECD publication “Benefits and Wages”
reports official net replacement rates as a function of unemployment duration, previous income
and a worker’s famility situation. On average, the data suggest a replacement rate of about
0.59. That is, we set bi to 0.59wi. We set the matching elasticity to 0.72. This value is the
estimate reported by Shimer (2005), which he bases on U.S. data for 1951-2003 and is close to
the estimates by Burda and Wyplosz (1994) for France, Germany and Spain. As is common
in this literature, we set the household’s bargaining power equal to the matching elasticity.
For the job separation rate we follow Christoffel et al. (2009) who calibrate the quarterly
separation rate in their search-and-matching DSGE model for the euro area to 6 percent. We
set the vacancy cost to 0.004, which corresponds to the estimate by Shimer (2010) for the US
and is only somewhat higher than the calibrated value for the euro area model in Christoffel
et al. (2009). We impose a wage rigidity parameter of 0.9 per quarter, in accordance with
Shimer (2010).25
Fiscal and Monetary Policy For our European sample, we set the steady-state ratio of
government purchases to GDP to the observed value in each country across our sample period.
Countries changed monetary policy over the sample period, especially during the 1990s and
with the introduction of the euro in 1999. In our model, we do not account for these changes.
Instead, we assign countries to the euro area according to their currency as of 2010.26 Some
countries followed a peg with the euro over (most of) the data period.27 The remaining
countries follow an independent monetary policy. All monetary authorities follow a Taylor
rule with φi = 0.75, φGDP = 0.50 and φpi = 1.50, which is in line with estimates reported by
Gal´ı and Gertler (1999).
25Our formulation follows Shimer (2010) who studies a large range of values centered around θw = 0.86 (or
θw = 0.95 at monthly frequency). Christoffel and Linzert (2005) study values in the range of 0.90 to 0.97. Hall
(2005) argues that a completely rigid real wage norm vastly increases the sensitivity of the standard search
and matching model to shocks and can therefore help solving the “Shimer puzzle” (Shimer, 2005).
26This includes Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Austria, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia and Finland.
27Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The latter three joined the euro area in 2011, 2014
and 2015, respectively.
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4.8.2 Estimation
Given these parameter values, we estimate the remaining five parameters. These parameters
describe the heterogeneity across members’ tastes for different locations, γ, the curvature of
the moving cost function, Φ′′, the curvature of the vacancy adjustment cost function, Υ′′, the
curvature of the investment adjustment cost function, Λ′′, and the persistence of the shock
process, ρ.
Our estimation procedure is as follows: Given a set of parameter values, we simulate the
model by choosing the realizations of jt that perfectly match the observed (state or country-
level) unemployment rate differentials uˆj,t in equation (3.1) for every country.
28 We then
calculate the following five moments from the model-implied data series and compare them to
their counterparts in the data: (i) the OLS slope coefficient from regressing the net migration
rate on the contemporaneous unemployment rate (see equation (3.3)), (ii) the OLS slope
coefficient from a regression of net migration on the one-year-lag of the unemployment rate,
(iii) the (annual) persistence of investment spending, (iv) the correlation between the date t
net export to GDP ratio and date t GDP and (v) an autocorrelation of zero for the structural
shocks jt .
29 We choose the five parameter values to minimize the squared difference between
the model-implied moments and the actual moments taken from the data.
Table 5 compares moments of the data with moments of the model. The second column of
the table reports estimates for our baseline model specification as described in Table 5. The
third column reports estimates for a high-trade-elasticity case.
The migration propensity γ governs the long-run reaction of migration to labor income
differentials across locations. The log-linearized first-order condition for migration (ignoring
the short-run adjustment costs) from country i to country j is
n˜ij,t = γU
i
1,i
[
whj ljw˜
h
j,t − whi liw˜hi,t
]
. (4.12)
The term in brackets is the absolute difference in wage income in the two contries. The term
γU i1,i is the semi-elasticity of migration to wage differentials. While the point estimate of γ is
the same across countries, U i1,i varies from one country to the next. Wealthy countries (e.g.,
28Note that while our empirical analysis was based on annual data, we calibrate our model at a quarterly
frequency. We therefore recover the innovations jt to match the quarterly unemployment rate differentials.
29We double-demean our GDP and investment data by first linearly de-trending the log series and then
removing a European-wide (weighted) average for every year. Net exports are calculated as real net exports
over 2005 nominal GDP in the data and real net exports over steady-state GDP in the model.
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Switzerland) have low values for the marginal utility of consumption while poor countries
(e.g., Bulgaria) have much higher values. Thus, in the model, the migration elasticity varies
across countries. In particular, people from poor countries should migrate much more than
people from wealthy countries. (This seems to be borne out in the data.) The unweighted
average value for U i1,iw
h
i li is 1.6. Combining this average with our estimate for γ gives an
average elasticity of approximately 8.1 meaning that a one percent change in wage income
across two average countries implies roughly a 8.1 percent change in the migrant population
in country j from country i.
The migration adjustment cost parameter Φ′′ has a point estimate of 4.94 suggesting that
migration reacts relatively slowly to changes in cross-country income differentials in the short-
run. In contrast, the estimated vacancy adjustment cost Υ′′ and the investment adjustment
cost parameter Λ′′ are both relatively low indicating that both the number of vacancies and
the investment rate can react sharply to temporary changes in economic conditions. For the
investment adjustment cost function, we estimate Λ′′ = 0.03, which implies that a (permanent)
one percent increase in Tobin’s Q would cause current investment spending to increase by
roughly 30 percent. This estimate is much lower than conventional estimates from closed-
economy models for the United States (see e.g Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 2005; Del
Negro et al., 2013; Brave et al., 2012). The difference is likely due to the fact that our model
features additional frictions to increasing production and investment and so does not rely on
high adjustment costs to reduce investment fluctuations. To interpret the estimate of Υ′′,
notice that the log-linearized first-order condition for vacancy creation by the HR firms, (4.9),
is
∆V˜t =
1
Υ′′
∞∑
s=0
βsEt
[
V˜ t+s
]
where Vt is the value of having an open vacancy. The term, [Υ′′]−1 is the elasticity of vacancy
creation to the value of having an open vacancy. Our estimate of Υ′′ = 0.72, implies that
a temporary 1 percent increase in the value of a vacancy causes a 1/0.72 = 1.39 percent
increase in the number of posted vacancies. Finally, our estimate of the persistence of the
shock process is ρ = 0.983 (quarterly). This estimate is close to the common calibration of
productivity shocks in business cycle models.
The estimates in the baseline specification do not change dramatically in the High Trade
Elasticity specification (column 3). The main difference arises with the estimation of the in-
vestment adjustment cost parameter (Λ′′) which is somewhat greater when the trade elasticity
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is high relative to the baseline estimate.
Model and Data Comparison The bottom sections of Table 5 report measures of model
fit for both the targeted moments and selected non-targeted moments in the data, the baseline
model and for the high-trade elasticity specification (column 3).
Since we have five parameters to estimate and five moments to match, we obtain a perfect
fit for the targeted moments. The model does relatively well with the untargeted moments
as well. The model matches the (annual) persistence of GDP (Q̂i,t), but generates insufficient
overall volatility in GDP in the cross section. One reason for this could be that our model
does not include TFP shocks, which would generate additional fluctuations in GDP beyond
movements in factor inputs. This could also explain why the (negative) correlation between
the unemployment rate and GDP is stronger in the model than in the data. The model
matches the persistence of GDP and consumption observed in the data almost perfectly. The
degree of risk sharing, measured by the relative standard deviation of consumption to GDP,
is somewhat stronger in the model relative to the data.30
5 Mundell’s Tradeoff: Mobility vs. Flexible Exchange
Rates
We next conduct a series of counterfactuals to evaluate Mundell’s conjecture: that adjustment
in the allocation of labor across countries can take the place of flexible exchange rates. To
evaluate this issue we compare our benchmark model to two counterfactual simulations. The
first simulation considers the effect of increased international labor mobility maintaining fixed
exchange rates. The second simulation considers the effect replacing the common currency
in the euro area with country-specific monetary policy and floating exchange rates. In each
experiment, we hold the sequences of country-specific shocks (recovered in the estimation
procedure) fixed while we change the model parameters. The country-specific shocks are
essentially shocks to the demand for the local good, which in turn affect the demand for
labor. The resulting changes in labor demand generate dispersion in unemployment rates and
income across the currency union. As Mundell conjectured, one way to mitigate this dispersion
30Our finding that the standard deviation of consumption exceeds the standard deviation of GDP in the
data is partly driven by our sample composition that includes several emerging economies in Central and
Eastern Europe. The standard deviation of consumption relative to output is often greater than 1 in less
advanced economies (see e.g. Neumeyer and Perri, 2005).
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is through the endogenous adjustment of labor supply, which entails the movement of workers
across countries. Alternatively, central banks could use monetary policy and exchange rate
adjustments to stimulate export demand.
We consider five measures of economic performance: the cross-sectional standard devia-
tions of the unemployment rate, GDP (aggregate and per capita), net migration and inflation
for the euro area. For each measure, we calculate the cross-sectional standard deviation in each
year and then average across 1995-2015. Panel A of Table 6 reports results for the simulations
with the baseline parameters. The table also reports the model-based slope coefficients from
the regressions of the net migration rates on the unemployment differentials in the simulated
data. The different counterfactual scenarios are listed in columns (2) through (5). Column
(1) reports the empirical measures as observed in the actual data.
Because we recover country-specific shocks that perfectly reproduce the paths of unem-
ployment rates across countries, the standard deviation of unemployment differentials in the
benchmark model is identical to the standard deviation in the data (2.38). While our es-
timation procedure matches the OLS slope coefficients of the net migration regressions for
Europe, the estimated model does not produce as much variation in GDP, GDP per capita
and inflation as observed in the data.
Column (3) shows the outcome when there is greater adjustment to local demand shocks
through the reallocation of labor. For this simulation, we use the same shocks, but we set
migration parameters to match U.S. migration rates. Specifically, we adjust the migration
propensity parameter γ and the migration adjustment cost Φ′′ to match the empirical values
for the OLS slope coefficients from regressions of net migration on contemporaneous and one-
year-lagged unemployment for the U.S. sample (−0.27 rather than −0.08 and −0.22 rather
than −0.07). All other parameter values and the realizations of the underlying shocks, jt ,
are kept the same as in our benchmark.31 Higher labor mobility reduces the cross-sectional
standard deviation in unemployment rates from 2.38 to 1.79. Because labor now flows to
economies where demand for the location-specific good is higher and out of countries where
demand is low, output dispersion across countries increases. On the other hand, per capita
output, which reflects both the change in local production and the change in the number
31Higher labor mobility can also be modeled as a higher share of expats in the overall population in steady
state,
∑
j 6=i n
j
i
Ni . As discussed above, this share is substantially higher in the U.S. than in Europe. In our model,
this share depends on both γ and the amenity values, Aij . We choose to keep the steady-state share of expats
the same across experiments, i.e. as we change γ we implicitly adjust Aij . Conditional on matching the OLS
slope coefficients for the U.S. it makes little difference whether Aij is adjusted or not.
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of workers, is now more similar across countries (under the benchmark specification, the
standard deviation of GDP per capita is 1.72 while in the high mobility scenario it is 1.33.)
Not surprisingly, the cross-sectional variation in net migration rises substantially from 0.24 in
the benchmark model to 0.64 in the high mobility case. Because the adjustment to demand
shocks occurs through the adjustment in the supply of inputs, there is less variation in marginal
costs and thus the dispersion in inflation rates across countries drops from 0.61 to 0.57.
Column (4) shows what would happen if labor were completely immobile in Europe. Had
there been no migration in response to shocks, there would have been significantly more
dispersion in unemployment and GDP relative to the benchmark. (Because workers stay in
the same location, there is no distinction between GDP and GDP per capita.) This simulation
suggests that although migration rates in Europe are low compared to the United States, the
current degree of labor mobility in Europe does provide a significant mechanism for responding
to country-specific shocks.
We now consider a counter-factual under which migration in the euro area remains at its
observed level but countries can respond to regional shocks by allowing the exchange rate
to adjust. When countries pursue independent monetary policy, changes in the exchange
rate mitigate the impact of local demand shocks. However, whether the monetary authority
responds aggressively to such demand shocks depends on whether it is willing to tolerate
inflation to achieve output stability. We consider two monetary policy rules. The first (column
5) is a standard Taylor rule. This rule places relatively more weight on inflation than output.
The second rule (column 6), is a Taylor rule in which output and inflation are weighted equally
by the monetary authority. Under the first rule (column 5), flexible exchange rates allow the
central bank to reduce unemployment differentials relative to the benchmark model (from
a standard deviation of 2.38 in the benchmark to 1.98). Similar to the high mobility case,
flexible exchange rates result in a substantial reduction in cross-country deviations in GDP
per capita (from 1.72 in the benchmark to 1.36). Because the monetary authority places a
significant weight on inflation stabilization, this scenario actually features a substantial decline
in the inflation differential across countries.
In the case where the monetary authority focuses equally on inflation and output (column
6), there is a greater reduction in unemployment differentials but there is more dispersion
in inflation. Indeed, the dispersion in inflation increases nearly three-fold. Thus, many of
the benefits of greater factor mobility (here captured by changes in labor migration) can be
achieved by independent monetary policy but only at the cost of greater inflation variability.
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The results from the counterfactual simulations demonstrate that migration can be as ef-
fective as independent monetary policy in reducing cross-sectional variation in unemployment.
The relative effectiveness of exchange rate adjustment and labor mobility depends, however,
on underlying parameter values that determine the responsiveness of labor demand and labor
supply. A negative demand shock puts downward pressure on real wages, employment and
output. Migration magnifies the drop in output and employment but limits the drop in wages
as workers flow from areas of high unemployment to areas of low unemployment. An exchange
rate devaluation also limits the decline in real wages by supporting demand for the home good
but alters relative prices. The extent to which exchange rate adjustment is effective as a sub-
stitute for migration depends on the elasticity of demand for the home good and the degree
of price and wage rigidity. Monetary policy is most effective if the trade elasticity is relatively
high (so that consumers readily substitute between home and foreign goods) and if prices are
relatively sticky (so that the change in the exchange rate is not fully passed through to prices).
To see this point, Panel B in Table 6 repeats the simulations when the trade elasticity
(ψy) is increased from 0.5 to 1.5. When we change the trade elasticity, we re-estimate the
parameters of the model. The estimates for the high trade elasticity case are listed in Table 5.
Turning to the results in Table 6, we see that with a higher trade elasticity, shifting from the
benchmark specification to higher labor mobility yields a smaller reduction in unemployment
dispersion (column (2) versus column (3)). On the other hand, flexible exchange rates result
in a much greater reduction in unemployment dispersion (column (2) versus column (5)). The
intuition for this result is straightforward: with a higher trade elasticity, consumers are more
sensitive to changes in the real exchange rate and as a result, exchange rate policy generates
large changes in relative demand. The same adjustment could occur through the movement
of labor, but at the cost of much higher dispersion in GDP across countries.
Another way to compare flexible exchange rates with high labor mobility is to examine the
actual paths of economic variables over time under different scenarios. Figure 9 shows time
series plots of the unemployment rate differentials, population (i.e., cumulative net migration
calculated as
∑t
s=1 n̂mi,s), and inflation for two country subgroups. The left panels show
the paths for the GIIPS countries while the right panels show the corresponding paths for
the countries in the EU10.32 Each pair of panels corresponds to a different variable and
within each panel we report the actual data (the solid line), the benchmark model (the filled
32GIIPS: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain. EU10: Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia.
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dotted line), the high mobility case (the dashed line) and the flexible exchange rate case (the
light dotted line). All series are double demeaned. For this comparison, monetary policy is
“aggressive” in the sense that the Taylor rule places equal weight on GDP and inflation.
The top panels show the unemployment rates. The paths of unemployment rates for the
data and the baseline calibration perfectly overlap by construction. In the figure, prior to
the onset of the Great Recession in 2007-08, unemployment was relatively low in the GIIPS
countries and somewhat high in the EU10 countries. The situation reversed sharply following
the recession. According to the model, if labor mobility in Europe were as high as it is
in the United States, the unemployment rates would have been substantially less divergent
both before and after the recession. Prior to the recession, workers would have stayed in
the GIIPS countries but after the recession began, the worker outflow would have increased
unemployment in the EU10 but reduced unemployment in GIIPS. The paths for these country
groups is similar under flexible exchange rates. Both mechanisms – flexible exchange rates
and labor mobility – serve to temper differential unemployment rates, partially vindicating
Mundell’s claim that labor mobility can operate as a substitute for floating exchange rates.
The middle panels show the change in population (cumulative net migration). In the
baseline model and the model with flexible exchange rates, the population time series is
similar to the path observed in the data. The similarity is particularly striking given that net
migration in the model almost exclusively reacts to changes in average household wages, which
reflect both the wage earned by employed workers and the probability of being unemployed.
In particular, we can clearly see the inflow (outflow) of migrants to the GIIPS (from the
EU10) countries before the crisis and the subsequent decline. The model matches quite well
the timing of the reversal in 2009 about three years after the reversal in unemployment rates.
(Key for this delayed response is the moving cost parameter Φ′′.) With high labor mobility
(the dark dashed line), the model predicts sizable changes in population in the two regions.
The bottom panels show inflation. Under flexible exchange rates, the model generates sharp
changes in inflation, particularly in the GIIPS subgroup.
To summarize, flexible exchange rates and labor mobility have similar implications for
the paths of unemployment over time. However, greater labor mobility entails significant
reallocation of population, much larger than has been experienced in Europe. On the other
hand, flexible exchange rates entail greater dispersion in inflation rates.
As a final comparison of flexible exchange rates and labor mobility, Figure 10 shows how
the cross sectional standard deviations of unemployment, GDP, GDP per capita and inflation
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vary as we smoothly transition from our benchmark specification to higher labor mobility or
more flexible exchange rates. Every dot or cross corresponds to a separate experiment. For
the solid dots, we slowly adjust the migration parameters γ and Φ′′ from their benchmark
values to the high-labor-mobility values used in column (3) of Table 6. The horizontal axis
is the weight set on the high-labor-mobility value, so the dot furthest to the left corresponds
to the baseline case and the dot furthest to the right corresponds to the high-labor-mobility
case. The crosses show outcomes as we smoothly transition from a completely fixed exchange
rate to a purely floating exchange rate. For intermediate cases, we assume the central banks
follow a hybrid monetary policy that puts some weight on a fixed nominal exchange rate as
opposed to a country-specific Taylor rule.33
The left panels in the figure show that the cross-sectional dispersion in unemployment
and GDP per capita both steadily drop as we gradually go from our baseline case (shown
as the large black dot on the vertical axis) to either fully mobile labor (the “+” marks)
or to a fully flexible exchange rate (the solid circles). For these two measures of economic
activity, Mundell’s conjecture is accurate – exchange rate flexibility and labor mobility serve
as substitutes in the sense that they have the same effects. The right panels show the cross-
sectional dispersion in aggregate GDP and inflation. For these measures, increases in labor
mobility and increases in exchange rate flexibility are clearly not the same. As labor becomes
more mobile, the dispersion in aggregate GDP rises. In contrast, as we shift towards more
and more independent monetary policy dispersion in aggregate GDP falls. Again, this is to be
expected. Allowing factors of production to flow across borders exaggerages regional demand
shocks. Counter-cyclical monetary policy tempers such shocks. Inflation variability doesn’t
change as factors flow from one country to the next but it does change with independent
monetary policy. Once a central bank is allowed to pursue its own domestic agenda, it can
trade off inflation variability for stable output or vice versa.
33More precisely, let x denote the weight depicted on the x-axis, then for the blue dots, the migration
parameters are
γ = (1− x)γbench + xγhlm
Φ′′ = (1− x)Φ′′bench + xΦ′′hlm,
where hlm indicates the high-labor-mobility value. Similarly, for the red crosses, the monetary policy rule
follows
(1− x)∆Ei,t + x
[
ii,t − ı¯i − φiii,t−1 − (1− φi)
(
φQQi,t + φpipii,t
)]
= 0.
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6 Conclusion
Euro area countries experienced vastly different paths of unemployment over the last ten years,
raising concerns about whether sharing a common monetary policy is sustainable without
further reforms. In this paper, we return to Mundell’s claim that cross-country labor mobility
can substitute for independent monetary policy. To evaluate his claim, we first empirically
examine whether labor mobility is indeed low in Europe, using the U.S. as a benchmark. The
data paint a very clear picture: Migration flows react to cyclical variations in unemployment
rates in Europe and across U.S. states, but this reaction is faster and about three times larger
in the United States.
Motivated by these facts we then quantify the benefits of higher labor mobility in Europe
in a multi-country New Keynesian dynamic general equilibrium model that we augment to
include cross-country migration and a search- and matching-framework in the labor market
that gives rise to unemployment. The model is calibrated to match the main features of
the European countries in our dataset including country size, trade flows and exchange rate
regimes. As a driving force the model features shocks to the demand for countries’ goods.
We choose the realizations of these shocks so that the model-generated unemployment series
matches observed unemployment rates. Our model replicates the low degree of labor mobiity
in Europe and broadly matches the dynamic behavior of macro variables observed in the data.
We then use the model to simulate outcomes in Europe with higher labor mobility or
with flexible exchange rates. In line with Mundell’s conjecture, greater labor migration and
exchange rate adjustment both reduce the cross-sectional dispersion in unemployment and
per capita GDP. However, the two counterfactual scenarios differ along other dimensions.
The movement of labor results in higher aggregate output in locations with high demand and
further reduces output in locations with low demand, resulting in widening output disparities
across Europe. In contrast, exchange rate flexibility works to offset fluctuations in demand and
thereby reduces aggregate output differentials at the expense of greater inflation dispersion.
While the theoretical arguments underpinning Mundell’s tradeoff have been understood since
its original publication, our analysis provides a quantitative assessment based on observed
trade patterns, existing monetary policy and measured differences in labor mobility in Europe
today. Based on our findings, Europe is still many steps away from meeting the conditions of
an optimum currency area.
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Table 1: MIGRATION STATISTICS
Unit US CAN Europe Euro
Regions # 48 10 29 12
Population m 5.57 2.94 17.30 26.28
Migration rate % 3.23 1.96 0.73 0.64
Internal migration % 3.11 1.53 0.46 0.34
Net migr rate (std dev) % 0.48 0.48 0.32 0.30
Notes: Table displays the number of regions (States / Provinces / Countries)
for the US, Canada and Europe, their average population (in millions), their
average migration rate, the average internal migration rate, and the average
standard deviation across time of the net-migration rate. Migration is the
average of inmigration and outmigration. Values are simple averages across
regions and time (’77-’15 for North America, ’95-’15 for Europe).
Table 2: UNEMPLOYMENT RATES AND NET MIGRATION
US CAN Europe Euro
β −0.272 −0.231 −0.081 −0.090
(0.029) (0.019) (0.009) (0.009)
R2 0.26 0.26 0.28 0.51
No. Obs. 1,872 390 460 224
Notes: Table displays the regression coefficient of the regres-
sion (3.3). Time period: ’77-’15 for US and Canada, ’95-’15 for
Europe. Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors in paren-
theses.
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Table 5: Estimation
(1) (2) (3)
Data line
Base-
elasticity
High trade
Calibrated Parameters
Trade elasticity ψy 0.500 1.500
Estimated Parameters
Migration propensity γ 5.102 5.525
Migration adjustment cost Φ′′ 4.637 4.995
Shock persistence ρ 0.983 0.986
Vacancy adjustment cost Υ′′ 0.724 0.715
Investment adjustment cost Λ′′ 0.029 0.052
Targeted Moments
Slope coefficient n̂mi,t on ûri,t −0.081 −0.081 −0.081
Slope coefficient n̂mi,t+1 on ûri,t −0.074 −0.074 −0.074
Correlation
n̂xi,t
Qi,t and Q̂i,t −0.303 −0.303 −0.303
Persistence jt 0.000 −0.000 0.000
Persistence Xˆi,t 0.671 0.671 0.671
Free Moments
Std. dev. Q̂i,t 3.540 1.752 1.789
Std. dev. Ĉi,t rel. to std. dev. Q̂i,t 1.365 0.784 0.744
Persistence Q̂i,t 0.712 0.706 0.718
Persistence Ĉi,t 0.750 0.747 0.739
Correlation Ĉi,t and Q̂i,t 0.735 0.800 0.854
Correlation ûri,t and Q̂i,t −0.587 −0.861 −0.861
Notes: Target refers to data moments for the European sample. nmi,t refers to net
migration as percent of population, ur denotes the unemployment rate, nxQ is net
exports over GDP,  refers to the exogenous shocks, X is per capita real investment,
C is per capita real consumption and Q is per capita real GDP.
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Table 6: COUNTERFACTUAL EXPERIMENTS FOR THE EURO AREA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Data Model
Estimated
mobility
High labor
mobility
No labor
exch rate
Flexible
exch rate
Aggr flex
Panel A: Simulations with Baseline Parameters
Cross-Sectional Standard Deviation
Unemployment rate 2.38 2.38 1.79 2.80 1.98 1.79
GDP 4.09 2.19 2.44 2.83 1.98 1.91
GDP per capita 3.74 1.72 1.33 2.83 1.36 1.24
Net migration 0.36 0.24 0.64 0.00 0.24 0.23
Inflation 1.66 0.61 0.57 0.66 0.29 1.06
Slope Coefficient on Unemployment Rate
Net migration −0.08 −0.08 −0.27 −0.00 −0.08 −0.08
Panel B: Simulations with High Trade Elasticity
Cross-Sectional Standard Deviation
Unemployment rate 2.38 2.38 2.00 2.52 1.83 1.57
GDP 4.09 2.23 2.83 2.58 1.93 1.82
GDP per capita 3.74 1.75 1.38 2.58 1.33 1.20
Net migration 0.36 0.24 0.70 0.00 0.23 0.21
Inflation 1.66 0.60 0.61 0.59 0.32 1.01
Slope Coefficient on Unemployment Rate
Net migration −0.08 −0.08 −0.27 −0.00 −0.08 −0.08
Notes: Table displays several statistics as observed in the data (1995 - 2015) and various model
settings. Statistics are calculated for the euro area. For the High Labor Mobility case (column (3))
we adjust the migration parameters (γ and Φ′′) to match the slope coefficients for the United States.
For the Flexible Exchange Rate case (column (5)), countries follow a Taylor rule with φi = 0.75,
φpi = 1.5 and φQ = 0.5. For the Aggressive Flexible Exchange Rate case (column (6)), we increase
φQ to 1.5.
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(a) Euro area (b) U.S.
Figure 1: Unemployment Rates in Euro Area Countries and US States
Notes: Figure displays unemployment rates for core euro area countries and the US states (grey, thin
lines), as well as their respective averages (blue, thick lines).
Figure 2: Migration Rates vs. Population
Note: The figure plots the migration-to-population ratio against population for US States, Canadian
Provinces, European and core euro area countries. Migration is measured as the average of immigration
and emigration. Values are averages over 1995 - 2015. The ’core euro area’ sample is a subset of the ’Europe’
sample.
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Figure 4: Cross-Sectional Standard Deviations in Unemployment Rates
Note: The figure plots cross-sectional standard deviation in demeaned unemployment rates, ûri,t, for four
regions: US states, Canadian provinces, European countries and core euro countries. The dotted lines are the
respective time averages. See the text for the definition of demeaned unemployment rates.
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û
r i
,t
co
n
tr
ol
in
g
fo
r
tw
o
la
gs
û
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(a) U.S.: 1977 - 2015 (b) Europe: 1995 - 2015
Figure 6: Net Migration Rate vs. Unemployment Rate
Note: The first panel plots the demeaned state net migration rates n̂mi,t for the U.S. against the demeaned
state unemployment rates ûri,t over 1977 - 2015. The second panel plots the corresponding data for the
European countries, 1995 - 2015. Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors in parentheses.
(a) U.S.: 1977 - 2015 (b) Europe: 1995 - 2015
Figure 7: Net Migration Rate vs. Unemployment Rate: Repeated Cross Sec-
tions
Note: The figure displays the coefficients from regressions of demeaned state / country net migration rates
vs. demeaned state / country unemployment rates (see equation (3.3)). Every coefficient corresponds to
a single year. Confidence intervals are βˆ ± 1.96ŝtderr, where standard errors are regular standard errors.
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Figure 9: Unemployment Rate, Population and Inflation in Data and Model
Notes: Panels display unemployment rates, cumulative net migration (“population”) and inflation both
in the data and the model, for GIIPS (left) and EU10 (right). All variables are double-demeaned.
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Figure 10: Cross-Sectional Standard Deviations in Counterfactuals
Notes: Panels display the cross-sectional standard deviations of the unemployment rate, GDP per capita,
GDP and inflation for the euro area implied by model, as a function of the degree of labor mobility and the
degree of floating. Degree of labor mobility ranges from 0 (corresponding to Benchmark case (’Estimated
Model’) in Table 6) to 1 (corresponding to case ’High labor mobility’ in Table 6. A degree of 0.3 means
that the labor mobility parameters γ and Φ′′ are set as a weighted average assigning a 0.3 weight to the
parameter combination to match labor mobility in Europe and a 0.7 weight to parameter combination
to match labor mobility in the U.S. Degree of floating ranges from 0 (corresponding to Benchmark case
(’Estimated Model’) in Table 6) to 1 (corresponding to case with flexible exchange rates (’Aggr flex exch
rate’) in Table 6). In intermediate cases, we assume that every country in the euro area sets its interest
rate as a weighted average of interest rates implied by a euro-area-wide Taylor rule and a country-specific
Taylor rule.
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